An Environmental Ethic of Experience

from a speech upon receiving the Albert Schweitzer Medal from the Animal Welfare Institute, December 5, 1962, Rachel Carson:

In his various writings, we may read Dr. Schweitzer's philosophical interpretations of that phrase [Reverence for Life]. But to many of us, the truest understanding of Reverence for Life comes, as it did to him, from some personal experience, perhaps the sudden, unexpected sight of a wild creature, perhaps some experience with a pet. Whatever it may be, it is something that takes us out of ourselves, that makes us aware of other life. From my own memories, I think of the sight of a small crab alone on a dark beach at night, a small and fragile being waiting at the edge of the roaring surf, yet so perfectly at home in its world. To me it seemed a symbol of life, and of the way life has adjusted to the forces of its physical environment. Or I think of a morning when I stood in a North Carolina marsh at sunrise, watching flock after flock of Canada geese rise from resting places at the edge of a lake and pass low overhead. In that orange light, their plumage was like brown velvet. Or I have found that deep awareness of life and its meaning in the eyes of a beloved cat.

Commentary: Ms. Carson’s epochal Silent Spring, that awakened the contemporary environmental movement offered a three part environmental ethic that spoke to 1) preserving human health, 2) respect for the intrinsic value of non-human life, and 3) keeping Nature for human edification and happiness.

How was this ethic arrived at? Through personal experience, that she later described as a sense of wonder, where the aesthetic, the intellectual, the intuitive, and the imaginative faculties converged. Moral psychologists, drawing on evolutionary biology, now speculate that “do no harm” is one of five moral colors that are hardwired into the human psyche; that "do no harm" is a recognition of the life of the other being.

Search yourself: Have you had experiences similar to the sort that Ms. Carson describes—a transformative experience that took you out of self into an awareness of another life or lives?Ms. Carson’s awareness didn’t anthropomorphize, but respected the other life on its own merits, for its own being. Have you ever encountered another life in its full uniqueness, what the philosopher Martin Buber declared to be a subject and not an object?

Animal Rights: An Ethic of Species Equality

in Tom Regan and Peter Singer (eds.), Animal Rights and Human Obligations, New Jersey, 1989, Peter Singer wrote:

A liberation movement demands an expansion of our moral horizons and an extension or reinterpretation of the basic moral principle of equality. Practices that were previously regarded as natural and inevitable come to be seen as the result of an unjustifiable prejudice. Who can say with confidence that all his or her attitudes and practices are beyond criticism? If we wish to avoid being numbered amongst the oppressors, we must be prepared to re-think even our most fundamental attitudes. We need to consider them from the point of view of those most disadvantaged by our attitudes, and the practices that follow from these attitudes. If we can make this unaccustomed mental switch we may discover a pattern in our attitudes and practices that consistently operates so as to benefit one group—usually the one to which we ourselves belong—at the expense of another. In this way we may come to see that there is a case for a new liberation movement. My aim is to advocate that we make this mental switch in respect of our attitudes and practices towards a very large group of beings: members of species other than our own—or, as we popularly though misleadingly call them, animals. In other words, I am urging that we extend to other species the basic principle of equality that most of us recognize should be extended to all members of our own species. …

But what is this capacity to enjoy the good life which all humans have, but no other animals? Other animals have emotions and desires and appear to be capable of enjoying a good life. We may doubt that they can think—although the behavior of some apes, dolphins, and even dogs suggests that some of them can—but what is the relevance of thinking? Frankena goes on to admit that by "the good life" he means "not so much the morally good life as the happy or satisfactory life," so thought would appear to be unnecessary for enjoying the good life; in fact to emphasize the need for thought would make difficulties for the egalitarian since only some people are capable of leading intellectually satisfying lives, or morally good lives. This makes it difficult to see what Frankena's principle of equality has to do with simply being human. Surely every sentient being is capable of leading a life that is happier or less miserable than some alternative life, and hence has a claim to be taken into account. In this respect the distinction between humans and nonhumans is not a sharp division, but rather a continuum along which we move gradually, and with overlaps between the species, from simple capacities for enjoyment and satisfaction, or pain and suffering, to more complex ones.

Commentary: Peter Singer is a controversial ethicist whose general outlook is utilitarian: the greatest good for the greatest number. His 1975 book Animal Liberation anticipated and helped lead the late 20th century animal rights movement, though he obviously prefers the notion of liberation over rights. This outlook seeks to lessen the oppression of animals generally by the human species. He also helped promote the notion of speciesism, similar to parallel prejudices such as racism and ageism.

Search Yourself: Do you consider yourself, a member of the human species, "superior" to other animals--perhaps along the old biblical line of a hierarchy of creation. Do you agree with Singer that suffering is a primary criterion on which to center an ethical system?