Lying: White Lies

from Lying: Moral Choice in Public and Private Life, Sissela Bok, 1978.

Any awareness of how lies spread must generate a real sensitivity to the fact that most lies be­lieved to be "white" are unnecessary if not downright undesirable. Many are not as harmless as liars take them to be. And even those lies which would generally be ac­cepted as harmless are not needed whenever their goals can be achieved through completely honest means. …

I would not wish to argue that all white lies should be ruled out. Individuals caught up in the practices of mak­ing inflated recommendations, for example, may have no other recourse. In a few cases, placebos may be the only reasonable alternative. And certain marginally deceptive social excuses and conventions are unavoidable if feelings are not to be needlessly injured.

But these are very few. And it is fallacious to argue that all white lies are right because a few are. As a result, those who undertake to tell white lies should look hard for alternatives. They should see even these lies as links in much wider practices and should know the ways in which these practices can spread. If they do, white lies, where truly harmless and a last resort—told, for instance, to avoid hurting someone's feelings—can be accepted as pol­icy, but only under such limited circumstances.

Most of us doubtless come into more frequent contact with white lies than with any other form of deception. To the extent that we train ourselves to see their ramifica­tions and succeed in eliminating them from our speech, the need to resort to them will diminish. If we can then make it clear to others that we stand in no need of white lies from them, many needless complications will have been avoided.

A word of caution is needed here. To say that white lies should be kept at a minimum is not to endorse the telling of truths to all comers. Silence and discretion, re­spect for the privacy and for the feelings of others must naturally govern what is spoken. The gossip one conveys and the malicious reports one spreads may be true with­out therefore being excusable. And the truth told in such a way as to wound may be unforgivably cruel, as when a physician answers a young man asking if he has cancer with a curt Yes as he leaves the room. He may not have lied, but he has failed in every professional duty of respect and concern for his patient.

Commentary: Few areas are more explicit regarding moral relativism than the realm of "white lies." Sissela Bok points out the dangers inherent in not taking white lies seriously. She cautions "most lies be­lieved to be 'white' are unnecessary if not downright undesirable." Few areas of morality are as ubiquitous /ordinary and therefore as dangerous a slippery slope. To thoughtlessly accept or offer white lies contributes to a culture of deceit.

Search yourself: When/how do you use "white lies." What is your motivation: to "save" yourself or to "save" the other? And what are you saving the self or the other from?

The Banality of Evil and an Ethic of Nonconformity

from "The Penguin Reader’s Guide" to Hannah Arendt's Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil (1963)

"Arendt portrays Eichmann as a 'joiner,' a conformist, describing him as 'a leaf in the whirlwind of time' (p. 32). It is this aspect of his character, according to her, rather than any deeply held convictions shared with the Nazi Party or a rabid hatred of Jews, that accounts for his actions during the war. Apart from determining Eichmann's motivation is the question that, as Arendt observes, must be asked of any criminal defendant: was he aware that his actions were in fact criminal? The prosecution had to assume that he was, as all ‘normal persons' would be (p. 26). But Arendt asserts that, 'under the conditions of the Third Reich only "exceptions" could be expected to react "normally"' (pp. 26–27). With considerable insight and detail, Arendt explains how Germany's leaders went about creating these conditions, to the point that 'conscience as such had apparently got lost in Germany.' There were individuals who resisted, she notes, but 'their voices were never heard' (p. 103).

"In Arendt's view, the real circumstances of Eichmann's actions never came fully to light during the trial. This is why, in part, the trial obscures what for Arendt is 'the lesson that this long course in human wickedness had taught us—the lesson of the fearsome, word-and-thought-defying banality of evil' (p. 252). Eichmann claimed that as his job shifted from forcing Jews from their homes to arranging for them to be killed, he was troubled by the new policy but felt duty-bound to obey his superiors. In fact, he said that not following orders was the only thing that would have given him a bad conscience."

* * *

“The Unknown Citizen”(1939) by W.H. Auden

(To JS/07/M/378 This Marble Monument Is Erected by the State)

He was found by the Bureau of Statistics to be
One against whom there was no official complaint,
And all the reports on his conduct agree
That, in the modern sense of an old-fashioned word, he was a saint,
For in everything he did he served the Greater Community.
Except for the War till the day he retired
He worked in a factory and never got fired,
But satisfied his employers, Fudge Motors Inc.
Yet he wasn't a scab or odd in his views,
For his Union reports that he paid his dues,
(Our report on his Union shows it was sound)
And our Social Psychology workers found
That he was popular with his mates and liked a drink.
The Press are convinced that he bought a paper every day
And that his reactions to advertisements were normal in every way.
Policies taken out in his name prove that he was fully insured,
And his Health-card shows he was once in hospital but left it cured.
Both Producers Research and High-Grade Living declare
He was fully sensible to the advantages of the Installment Plan
And had everything necessary to the Modern Man,
A phonograph, a radio, a car and a frigidaire.
Our researchers into Public Opinion are content
That he held the proper opinions for the time of year;
When there was peace, he was for peace; when there was war, he went.
He was married and added five children to the population,
Which our Eugenist says was the right number for a parent of his generation.
And our teachers report that he never interfered with their education.
Was he free? Was he happy? The question is absurd:
Had anything been wrong, we should certainly have heard.

Commentary: Hannah Arendt and W.H. Auden look at modern man/woman, c. mid 20th century, as conformist, who do not think for his/her self and therefore have no conscience, or at the very least whose conscience is mere loyalty to the state or an echo of public opinion. Arendt and Auden insinuate an ethic centered in reason or rational thought with a commensurate responsive conscience: an ethic of non-conformity and personal responsibility. In the contemporary world one must be a non-conformist to be truly free and then possibly happy.

Search yourself: Do you imagine your life in society "as a leaf in the whirlwind of time?" Dare you ask yourself, "Am I free, am I happy?" Are you complicit in the banality of evil?

Reverence for Life

from "The Ethics of Reverence for Life," Albert Schweitzer, in “Christendom” Magazine, 1936

“Here, then, is the first spiritual act in man’s experience: reverence for life. The consequence of it is that he comes to realize his dependence upon events quite beyond his control. Therefore he becomes resigned. And this is the second spiritual act: resignation. …

“I have said that resignation is the very basis of ethics. Starting from this position, the will-to-live comes first to veracity as the primary ground of virtue. If I am faithful to my will-to-live, I cannot disguise this fact, even though such disguise or evasion might seem to my advantage. Reverence for my will-to-live leads me to the necessity of being sincere with myself. And out of this fidelity to my own nature grows all my faithfulness. Thus, sincerity is the first ethical quality which appears. However lacking one may be in other respects, sincerity is the one thing which he must possess. Nor is this point of view to be found only among people of complex social life. Primitive cultures show the fact to be equally true there. Resignation to the will-to-live leads directly to this first virtue: sincerity.

“Having reached this point, then, I am in a position to look at the world. I ask knowledge what it can tell me of life. Knowledge replies that what it can tell me is little, yet immense. Whence this universe came, or whither it is bound, or how it happens to be at all, knowledge cannot tell me. Only this: that the will-to-live is everywhere present, even as in me. I do not need science to tell me this; but it cannot tell me anything more essential. Profound and marvelous as chemistry is, for example, it is like all science in the fact that it can lead me only to the mystery of life, which is essentially in me, however near or far away it may be observed.

“What shall be my attitude toward this other life? It can only be of a piece with my attitude towards my own life. If I am a thinking being, I must regard other life than my own with equal reverence. For I shall know that it longs for fulness and development as deeply as I do myself. Therefore, I see that evil is what annihilates, hampers, or hinders life. And this holds good whether I regard it physically or spiritually. Goodness, by the same token, is the saving or helping of life, the enabling of whatever life I can to attain its highest development. …

“Reverence for life is a universal ethic.

“We do not say this because of its absolute nature, but because of the boundlessness of its domain. Ordinary ethics seeks to find limits within the sphere of human life and relationships. But the absolute ethics of the will-to-live must reverence every form of life, seeking so far as possible to refrain from destroying any life, regardless of its particular type. It says of no instance of life, "This has no value." It cannot make any such exceptions, for it is built upon reverence for life as such. It knows that the mystery of life is always too profound for us, and that its value is beyond our capacity to estimate. We happen to believe that man’s life is more important than any other form of which we know. But we cannot prove any such comparison of value from what we know of the world’s development. True, in practice we are forced to choose. At times we have to decide arbitrarily which forms of life, and even which particular individuals, we shall save, and which we shall destroy. But the principle of reverence for life is none the less universal.”

Commentary: There is simplicity, yet universality, to Albert Schweitzer's ethic of Reverence for Life. Each of us, with a will-to-live, reveres one's own life. (We want to live and to live without suffering.) Through reason we see the same will-to-live in all other life forms. And what we want for self, life and freedom from suffering, we logically and compassionately, that is ethically, extend to those life forms. Yet we cannot live without taking life and inflicting pain. We endure ambivalence when we affirm and act from a simple ethical rubric: it is good to enhance life and it is evil to destroy life.

Search yourself: In what ways do you act so as to do as little harm as possible? (Example: as a vegetarian I eat eggs for protein, yet have vowed to buy only cage-free eggs, since caged hens appear to endure extraordinary suffering.) Also, because we must live with a resulting moral ambivalence (inevitably we take life and cause suffering for our particular welfare), how do you express reverence to the life forms that have been harmed?

Indifference

from "The Perils of Indifference," a speech, Elie Wiesel, April, 1999

"What is indifference? Etymologically, the word means "no difference." A strange and unnatural state in which the lines blur between light and darkness, dusk and dawn, crime and punishment, cruelty and compassion, good and evil. What are its courses and inescapable consequences? Is it a philosophy? Is there a philosophy of indifference conceivable? Can one possibly view indifference as a virtue? Is it necessary at times to practice it simply to keep one's sanity, live normally, enjoy a fine meal and a glass of wine, as the world around us experiences harrowing upheavals?

"Of course, indifference can be tempting -- more than that, seductive. It is so much easier to look away from victims. It is so much easier to avoid such rude interruptions to our work, our dreams, our hopes. It is, after all, awkward, troublesome, to be involved in another person's pain and despair. Yet, for the person who is indifferent, his or her neighbor are of no consequence. And, therefore, their lives are meaningless. Their hidden or even visible anguish is of no interest. Indifference reduces the Other to an abstraction. ...

"In a way, to be indifferent to that suffering is what makes the human being inhuman. Indifference, after all, is more dangerous than anger and hatred. Anger can at times be creative. One writes a great poem, a great symphony. One does something special for the sake of humanity because one is angry at the injustice that one witnesses. But indifference is never creative. Even hatred at times may elicit a response. You fight it. You denounce it. You disarm it.

"Indifference elicits no response. Indifference is not a response. Indifference is not a beginning; it is an end. And, therefore, indifference is always the friend of the enemy, for it benefits the aggressor -- never his victim, whose pain is magnified when he or she feels forgotten. The political prisoner in his cell, the hungry children, the homeless refugees -- not to respond to their plight, not to relieve their solitude by offering them a spark of hope is to exile them from human memory. And in denying their humanity, we betray our own.

"Indifference, then, is not only a sin, it is a punishment."

C0mmentary: Elie Wiesel raises up the value of humanity. In saying, Indifference reduces the Other to an abstraction, he echoes the relational theology of Martin Buber. Buber posited that meaning is found through relationships, when subject (I) encounters subject (thou). (And according to Buber all genuine relationships converge in the Eternal Thou or God.)

Wiesel asks, Can one possibly view indifference as a virtue? Is it clear that indifference is never a virtue. In fact it is both a sin and a punishment.

The ethic Elie Wiesel puts foward is a hard, relentless, unforgiving ethic.

Search yourself: To whom are you indifferent? And what is your punishment? (How is your humanity diminished?) Is it possible to live in the real world without lapses of indifference, without subsequent sin and punishment?